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Health Care Utilization Review:
Potential Exposures to Negligence Liability
I. INTRODUCTION
Both public and private health insurers have struggled in recent years to
find ways to control the rising costs of health care. 1 One of the most widely
adopted methods that insurers have turned to is utilization review. Utilization
review can be defined as "[e]valuation of the necessity, appropriateness, and
efficiency of the use of medical services, procedures, and facilities." 2 Insurers,
trying to control costs, use utilization review to evaluate claims on a case-by-
case basis. If, after a claim has been reviewed, the insurer believes that the
medical care given or proposed is not necessary or appropriate to the treatment
of the patient, the insurer will deny payment of the claim on the grounds that it
is not "medically necessary. "3
Utilization review can be either retrospective or prospective. In
retrospective utilization review, the review of the claim comes after the care
has been given. Therefore, while a retrospective payment denial may lead to
heated disputes over who will pay the doctor or hospital, it usually does not
have a significant impact on the patient's care.4
Under prospective utilization review, however, the review of the patient's
claim comes before the care is to be given. Thus, when the insurer denies a
SAlthough health care costs have traditionally grown faster than the general rate of
inflation (U.S. health care expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product
(GNP) nearly doubled between 1965 and 1987), the growth of health care costs has become
particularly alarming in recent years. For instance, total health care spending grew from
$324 billion to $500 billion just from 1982 to 1987. See Levit, Freeland, & Waldo, Health
Spending and Ability to Pay: Business, Individuals, and Government, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Spring 1989, at 1, 3.
2 T. TIMMRECK, DICIONARY OF HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT 613 (2d ed.
1987).
3 The term "medical necessity" is widely used in the utilization review industry, but it
may be used differently by different organizations. Some may use it narrowly to refer to the
clinical need for a procedure, whereas others may use it to refer to both clinical need
(necessity) and appropriateness. INSTIIUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND
CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 18 (1989).
4 It has been pointed out that retrospective denial of payment "will save money for the
third party, but without warning will divert the cost to the patient or hospital." Zusman,
Utilization Review: Theory, Practice, and Issues, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNrTY PSYCHIATRY
531, 534 (1990). Therefore, while retrospective utilization review might reduce costs on an
individual payor level, it is generally unsatisfactory as a cost containment device on a
broader, societal level. The care has already been given by the time review is undertaken,
and the question at that time is not whether the care will be paid for, but who will pay.
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claim, the patient is told up front that his insurance company will not pay for
the proposed care, and that he must pay for the care out of his own pocket if he
wishes to receive it.5
The patient may, of course, still go ahead with the treatment. However, he
may decline to do so, either because he cannot afford to pay for the treatment
himself or because he feels that the burden of paying for the treatment himself
outweighs its benefit to him. Having foregone the proposed treatment, the
patient may subsequently suffer some harm. If the utilization review
organization's denial of payment was negligent and its negligence was the cause
of the patient's harm, the patient may have a cause of action against the
organization. The issue, therefore, is this: When, and under what
circumstances, can a utilization review organization's denial of payment be said
to have negligently harmed a patient?
This Note will examine the potential negligence liability of third-party
payors who use prospective utilization review as a means of controlling their
health care costs. It will first discuss the cause of action of negligence and the
special problems courts may encounter in applying it to the context of
utilization review. Next, it will discuss in detail the two leading California
cases that have dealt with the issue of negligent utilization review. Then, it will
address the issue of direct versus indirect liability for negligent utilization
review. Finally, the Note will look at potential barriers to utilization review
liability.6
II. THE CAUSE OF AcioN
The cause of action of negligence consists of four basic elements. They
are:
5 Two of the more common forms of prospective utilization review are preadmission
review and concurrent review. Preadmission review for elective inpatient procedures allows
the reviewer to examine proposed hospital admissions for "medical necessity" before the
patient is admitted. Concurrent review, on the other hand, allows the reviewer to assess "the
length of stay for both urgent and nonurgent admissions"while the patient is in the hospital.
INsTrrIrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 18.
6 The focus of this Note is limited to the potential negligence liability resulting from
utilization review denials of payment. Keep in mind, however, that enterprising attorneys
may be able to hold utilization review organizations liable on other theories as well. See,
e.g., Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. California, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 845-46, 263 Cal. Rptr.
850, 856-57 (1989) (insurer breached implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
denying benefits when it employed a standard of medical necessity "significantly at variance
with the medicai .andards of the community" in conducting its review and when it failed to
properly investigate its insured's claim).
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1. A duty recognized by law that requires the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct;
2. A breach of that duty, or a failure to conform to the standard;
3. A causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff's injury; and,
4. An actual loss or injury to the plaintiff.7
Actual loss or injury and breach of duty, once a duty has been established,
are matters of fact to be proven by the plaintiff at trial and are therefore
relatively straightforward. However, the other two elements, the existence of a
duty and a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury, present
certain conceptual difficulties when applied to third-party utilization decisions.
The element of duty can be broken down into two components. The first is
the question of whether a duty exists at all: Do third-party utilization review
organizations owe a" duty of care to the patients whose claims they review? It
has been said that "courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable
persons would recognize it and agree that it exists." 8
The question of the existence of a duty is sometimes discussed in terms of
foreseeability of harm.9 As noted above, patients whose claims for treatment
have been denied may very well decide against receiving the treatment. If the
treatment does turn out to have been medically necessary, then the potential for
injury to the patient is clearly "foreseeable." Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that "courts will almost certainly find that payors owe a duty to their
beneficiaries to perform utilization review programs with due care. " 1°
The second component of the element of duty is that of the standard of
care: What is the nature of the standard of care to which utilization review
organizations should be held? Two related standards of care have been
suggested. First, utilization review organizations could be held to a standard of
care in the design and implementation of their review programs (a procedural
standard). This procedural standard presumably would be based on
acceptable practice among the general community of review organizations. 12
Several sets of suggested utilization review practices have been proposed with
the intent to improve review quality and reduce potential liability exposure in
7 W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEErONI.
8 Id. at 359.
9 Helvestine, Legal Implications of Utilization Review, in CONTROLLING COSTS AND
CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTIMzATiON MANAGEMENT 169, 175
(Institute of Medicine, 1989).
10 Jespersen & Kendall, Utilization Review: Avoiding Liability While Controlling Costs,
HEALTHSPAN, July 1987, at 3, 4.
11 Helvestine, supra note 9, at 176.
12 Id.
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the utilization review industry, and they could be helpful in determining the
procedural standard. 13
Second, utilization review organizations could be held to a standard of care
in their. determination of medical necessity (a medical standard). 14 As
utilization review organizations "at least implicitly hold themselves out as
having special skill in the evaluation of medical treatment," Is the medical
standard should be that of accepted medical practice.
The element of causation can also be broken down into two components.
One concerns whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the denial
of payment for treatment and the harm resulting from the foregoing of that
treatment. In other words, is the denial of payment the proximate cause of the
patient's harm? As the matter has been stated, "[s]trictly speaking, [a utilization
review organization's] determination of a lack of medical justification for
services affects only payment by the health insurer or other third party. The
determination does not preclude the provider from rendering the proposed
services if the patient desires them." 16 If the decision to forego treatment- a
clinical decision made by the patient and his physician-cannot be linked to the
denial of payment-afinancial decision made by the review organization, then
the denial of payment by the review organization cannot be the proximate cause
of the patient's harm.
Of course, the above discussion assumes that the patient would not have
suffered the harm if he had received the treatment. This leads to the second
component of causation, causation in fact. As in an ordinary medical
malpractice case, the patient must prove that the proposed treatment would
have prevented the harm suffered from occurring, or the review organization
will not be liable as it is not the cause in fact of the patient's injury. 17
EE. THE CASES
Two leading cases, both decided in the state of California, deal with the
potential negligence liability of third-party utilization review organizations. In
13 See Jespersen & Kendall, supra note 10, at 7; Hinden & Elden, Liability Issues for
Managed Care Entities, 14 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 56-58 (1990).
14 Helvestine, supra note 9, at 176.
15 Jespersen & Kendall, supra note 10, at 4.
16 Hershey, Fourth-Party Audit Organizations: Practical and Legal Considerations, 14
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 54, 62 (1986) (emphasis added).
17 Consider the following: The patient suffers irreversible brain damage in a fall and
eventually dies. The defendant physician is clearly negligent in failing to diagnose the
patient's skull fracture. However, the physician is not held liable because the plaintiff cannot
show that the patient would have lived had the doctor diagnosed the skull fracture and
treated the patient accordingly. Neal v. Welker, 426 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968),
cited in D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 165 (1973).
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1986, a California Court of Appeals in Wickline v. State of California1 8 became
the first court to address the issue, holding that utilization review organizations
may be held liable for negligence in some situations. Although its
determination of the scope of liability was fairly narrow, the case caused great
concern in the insurance and utilization review industries and was widely
discussed. 19
Wickline remained the most important case to address the issue of
utilization review organization liability until 1990, when the same California
Court of Appeals decided Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California.2" The
court in Wilson expanded the potential liability of utilization review
organizations, taking great pains to distinguish the case from Wickline in doing
so and causing even greater concern in the insurance and utilization review
industries. The following section of this Note will examine the Wickline and
Wilson cases, paying particular attention to how they handle the issues of duty
and causation, in order to get a sense of the development of this emerging area
of liability.
A. Wickline v. State of California
1. The Facts
Lois J. Wickline was being treated by her family physician for problems
with her back and legs. 21 Because she was not responding to his treatment, her
doctor called in a vascular surgeon who determined that the problem was
circulatory and that an operation was necessary. 22 Since Wickline was covered
under Medi-Cal, California's Medicaid program, her family doctor submitted a
treatment authorization request to Medi-Cal as provided for by statute.23 Medi-
Cal authorized payment for the surgery and ten days of hospitalization. 24
The vascular surgeon, assisted by a second surgeon, performed the
operation. Wickline's recovery was "stormy," however, and she experienced
complications which required the surgeons to perform two more operations. 25
18 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986).
19 See, e.g., Note, Provider Liability Under Public Law 98-21: The Medicare
Prospective Payment System in Light of Wickine v. State, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 1011
(1985); Schanz, Wickline v. State of California: aosing the Door of Third-Party Payor
Liability?, 22 ToRT & INs. L.J. 331 (1987).
20 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
21 Widckine, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1634, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
22 Id. at 1634-35, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
23 Id. at 1635, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
24 Id.
2 Id.
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Because of the complications, Wickline's doctors requested Medi-Cal to
authorize payment for an additional eight days of hospitalization, so that she
could be observed and treated immediately if further complications arose.26
However, based on the information contained in her doctors' request, the
Medi-Cal consultant authorized payment for only four additional days.
Wickline's doctors subsequently discharged her from the hospital after the
additional four days without appealing the Medi-Cal consultant's decision. 27
After her discharge, Wickline experienced progressive pain and
discoloration in her right leg. On the ninth day after her discharge, Wickline
was readmitted to the hospital as an emergency patient, therefore not requiring
prior authorization of payment.28 Upon examination, her doctors discovered
clotting and infection in the incision which ultimately led to the amputation of
her right leg.29
Wickline then sued Medi-Cal, claiming that it was negligent in not
authorizing payment for the full eight day extension requested by her doctors,
and that its denial of payment subsequently caused her to lose her leg.30 The
trial court awarded her five hundred thousand dollars, 31 but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that Medi-Cal, in this particular case, was not liable
as a matter of law.32 However, the court of appeals also noted that "[t]he
patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which should
have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries suffered
from all those responsible for the deprivation of such care, including, when
appropriate, health care payors." 33
2. Duty
The court in Wickline answered the question of whether utilization review
organizations owe a duty of care to the patients whose claims they review by
citing section 1714 of the California Civil Code 34 and the case of Rowland v.
Christian.35 Section 1714 of the Civil Code states that "[e]very one is
26 Id. at 1636, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
27 Id. at 1637-39, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
28 Id. at 1640-41, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
29 Id. at 1641, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
30 Id. at 1633, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811. Wickline did not sue her own doctors. It has
been reported that this was because "[sihe felt they were victims of the system, as she
herself had been." Carlova, A Jury Lands a $509,000 Haymaker on Health Bureaucrats,
MED. ECONOMICS, May 16, 1983, at 80, 83.
31 Carlova, supra note 30, at 85.
32 W cldine, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1647, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
33 Id. at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (emphasis added).
3 4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
35 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
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responsible, not only for the results of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management
of his property or person ..... 36 The California Supreme Court in Rowland v.
Christian rephrased this section, stating that "[a]ll persons are required to use
ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct." 37
Going further, the Rowland court also noted that "in the absence of
statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle
enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be
made unless clearly supported by public policy." 38 Therefore, the court in
Wicldine seems to be saying that utilization review organizations, just like
everyone else, generally owe a duty of care to patients unless a statute or policy
supports an exception to the duty. The court did not discuss the issue further,
as it ultimately based its decision on the issue of causation.
With regard to the standard of care to which utilization review
organizations should be held, the court in Wickline clearly contemplates that
review organizations should be held to a procedural standard of care, as it
states that:
[tihird party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost-containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals
made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored
or unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 39
The court did discuss the testimony given at trial regarding the procedures
followed by Medi-Cal both in general and in Wickline's case. By not criticizing
these procedures, the court at least implicitly accepted them as being
adequate. 40 Unfortunately, however, it did not reveal the standard against
which it measured the Medi-Cal procedures because, as noted above, its
decision rested on other grounds.
As to the medical standard of care, the court noted that Title 22 of the
California Administrative Code, which governs Medi-Cal, provided that "[t]he
determination of need for acute care shall be made in accordance with the usual
standards of medical practice in the community." 41 Therefore, a medical
36 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
37 Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100, 443 P.2d at 564.
38 Id.
39 Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1986).
40 Helvestine, supra note 9, at 176.
41 The court of appeals construed the California Administrative Code as it existed at
the time of Wickline's injury; the section in question had been amended between the time of
Wickline's injury and the time her case was heard by the court of appeals. CAL. ADMIN.
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standard of care was imposed on Medi-Cal by regulation. Because all of the
expert witnesses at the trial testified that the discharge of Wickline after only
four additional days was "within the standards of practice of the medical
community," the appellate court could reasonably conclude that the denial of
payment met accepted medical practice (although it did not make this point
explicitly). 42 On the other hand, the Wickline court did not directly discuss the
issue of whether utilization review organizations generally should be held to a
medical standard of care in their determinations of medical necessity.
3. Causation
Ultimately, the court's determination in Wicldine that Medi-Cal was not
liable was based on lack of causation; the court decided that Medi-Cal was not
the proximate cause of Wickline's injury. The Wickline court framed the issue
of proximate cause in terms of determining "who bears responsibility for
allowing a patient to be discharged from the hospital.... ."4 The court found
that the responsibility to discharge rests with the patient's own physician,
reasoning that if, in his medical judgment, Wickline required further
hospitalization, her doctor "should have made some effort to keep her" in the
hospital. 44 However, the court found that her own doctor's medical judgment
was to discharge her, and that "Medi-Cal was not a party to that medical
decision and therefore cannot be held to share in the harm resulting if such
decision was negligently made. " 45 In the court's view, the.discharge decision
rests with the physician, independent of the utilization review determination, so
that denial of payment cannot be the proximate cause of the patient's harm. As
a result, the court held that Medi-Cal was not liable as a matter of law.
One factor that the court found significant in deciding Wickline was the fact
that none of her doctors appealed the Medi-Cal payment denial, although they
all knew that they could do so. 46 The court felt that physicians have a duty to
appeal payment denials on behalf of the patient when they disagree with the
reviewer's determination of medical necessity. 47 According to the court, the
failure of Wickline's doctors to appeal the denial implied agreement with it, so
CODE § 51110 (West 1983), cited in Wickine, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
819.
42 W ckine, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1640, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
43 Id. at 1644, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
44 Id. at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
45 Id. at 1646, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
46 Id. at 1639, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
47 The view that physicians should act as "advocates" for their patients when dealing
with third-party payors and reviewers has been expressed in recent literature. See, e.g.,
Furrow, The Ethics of Cost Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine and the Doctor as Patient
Advocate,3 NOTRE DAMEJ. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL. 187 (1988).
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that the Medi-Cal payment denial could not be said to have corrupted their
medical judgment.48 However, the court left open the possibility that it might
be more willing to find proximate cause in cases where the patient's physician
appealed a payment denial and the appeal was also denied. The court's
statement of the applicable law said only that "the physician who complies
without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when his
medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility
for his patient's care. " 49
There was also some dispute in Wickline as to causation in fact; that is,
whether Wickline would not have lost her leg if she had remained hospitalized
the full eight additional days.50 Although her surgeon testified that, in his
opinion, she would not have lost her leg if she had remained hospitalized, her
family doctor testified that he saw her in his office one week after her
discharge, at which time she would have been home even if the full
hospitalization request had been granted, and he had not seen anything
unusual.51 Therefore, the denied hospitalization for observation might not have
prevented the loss of Mrs. Wickline's leg.
B. Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California
1. The Facts
On March 1, 1983, Howard Wilson Jr. admitted himself to the hospital,
suffering from "major depression, drug dependency, and anorexia."52 Wilson's
physician believed that Wilson required three to four weeks of hospitalization.
However, on March 11, 1983, Western Medical Review, the utilization review
organization responsible for reviewing Wilson's claim, informed his doctor that
Wilson's hospitalization was "not justified or approved" and that payment for
further hospital care would not be made.53 Wilson's doctor believed that
Wilson "required further in-patient treatment," but the doctor did not appeal
Western Medical's determination. Instead, he informed Wilson that "he
(Wilson) would 'not be covered financially by his insurance company and that
the liability [for hospital costs] would then be his.' '54 Wilson was not happy
with the decision, but he had to leave the hospital because, according to his
aunt, "the family did not have enough money to pay for the cost of in-patient
48 Wickkine, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1646-47, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
49 Id. at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (emphasis added).
5 0 Id. at 1642, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
51 Id.
52 Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. California, 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 663, 271 Cal. Rptr.
810, 877 (1990).
53 Id. at 669-70, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
54 Id.
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hospitalization. "5 Subsequently, on March 31, 1983, Wilson committed
suicide.56
Wilson's parents then filed suit against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Alabama (who covered Wilson), Blue Cross of Southern California (to whom
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama had delegated the administration of
claims, including Wilson's), Western Medical Review (who had contracted
with Blue Cross of Southern California to perform utilization review), and the
Western Medical physician reviewer who handled Wilson's claim. 57 Alabama
Blue Cross, Western Medical, and the Western Medical physician all filed
summary judgment motions, arguing that, under Wickline, the decision to
discharge Wilson was the sole responsibility of his doctor, that public policy
considerations warrant an exemption for utilization review organizations from
the general rule of liability, and that Wilson's doctor had a duty to protest the
decision which he failed to carry out.58
The trial court granted the summary judgment motions, and the Wilsons
appealed.59 The court of appeals reversed, holding that there were triable
claims, and remanded the case back to the trial court.60 In doing so, the court
of appeals stated that "Wickline should be limited to its facts and the legal
issues properly decided in that case. ... "61 As a result, much of the discussion
of duty and causation in Wilson consists of refinement, reinterpretation, or
limitation of the discussion of those issues in Wickline.
2. Duty
In filing their summary judgment motions, the defendants raised only the
first of the two components of duty discussed earlier in this Note,62 the
question of the existence of a duty. Therefore, only the existence of a duty (and
not the issue of the standard of care) is discussed in Wilson. Both the Wilson
court and the defendants accepted the basic proposition set forth in Wickline:
Utilization review organizations owe a duty of care to the patients whose claims
they review unless they are relieved of that duty by a statutory or policy
exemption. 63 The defendants, therefore, argued that they were entitled to a
55 Id.
56 Id. at 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
57 Id. at 667, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
58 Id. at 671-74, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883-85.
59 Id. at 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
60 Id. at 674-75, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
61 Id. at 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
62 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
63 The court of appeals in Wilson discusses the analysis of duty in Wickdine dealing
with section 1714 of the California Administrative Code and Rowland with seeming
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policy exemption because "there are important public policy considerations
which warrant protecting insurance companies and related entities which
conduct concurrent utilization review." 64
The Wilson court disagreed. First of all, the court noted that Medi-Cal's
duty to provide funds was governed by "statutes and regulations [which]
altered the normal course of tort liability... [by permitting] the state to deny
Medi-Cal benefits when to do so was 'in accordance with the usual standards of
medical practice in the community.'" 65 In other words, Medi-Cal had a
statutory exemption to the duty of care which it in fact met, as the discharge in
Wickline was within accepted practice. The defendants in Wilson, however,
were private insurers, and had no such statutory exemption. 66
Second, the court stated that "the normal basis of tort liability can only be
departed from when 'public policy clearly requires that an exeption be
made.'" 67 In the court's view, the statutes and regulations governing Medi-Cal
expressed a clear public policy in Wickline, but the defendants in Wilson had
"no similar clearly expressed public policy .. -68 Therefore, the court in
Wilson found that the defendants were subject to the ordinary duty of care.
3. Causation
The defendants in Wilson argued that they were not liable as a matter of
law because, under Wickline, "when a treating physician makes a decision to
discharge a patient because an insurance company refuses to pay
benefits.., the sole liability rests with the [patient's] physician." 69 As noted
previously, this is because the Wickline court considered the denial of payment
to have no part in the discharge decision itself, and therefore payment denial
could not be the proximate cause of the patient's harm.70
The Wilson court discarded this view, taking a different approach to the
issue of causation. First, the court in Wilson dismissed the language in Wickline
stating that "the physician... cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his
patient's care"as dicta which was "unnecessary to the decision .. ."71 This is
approval, and the defendants did not dispute it. Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 671-74, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 883-85.
6 4 Id. at 672, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
65 Id. at 665-66, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (citing Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d
1630, 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1986)).
66 Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 665-66, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
67 Id. at 673, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884, (citing Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 362,
372, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636, 644 P.2d 822, 829 (1982) (emphasis added)).
68 Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 673,271 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
69 Id. at 671, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
70 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
71 Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
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suprising, as this language had seemed to be the basis of the court's decision in
Wickline. However, the court in Wilson stated that the "legitimate rationale" of
Wickline was that Medi-Cal was governed, not by the ordinary rules of
liability, but by a statutory standard of duty (to determine payment in
accordance with accepted medical practice) to which it did in fact conform (the
payment denial was within accepted medical practice). 72 Given that basis for
deciding Wickline, the broad statement that liability rests solely with the
physician becomes unnecessary and superfluous.
Second, the Wilson court dismissed the proposition that liability for
discharge decisions rests solely with the patient's physician on the grounds that
it "misconstrues the test for joint liability for tortious conduct. "7 3 For the
correct proposition of law, the court turned to section 431 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states that "[tihe actor's negligent conduct is a legal
cause of harm to another if... his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm... ."74 After asserting that the Restatement provision
"correctly states California law as to the issue of causation in tort cases,"7 5 the
court examined the facts in Wilson to determine if the substantial factor test had
been met. First, the court noted that "[o]nce the insurance benefits were
terminated, there were no other funds to pay for [Wilson's] hospitalization,"
and that this lack of funds was "[tjhe sole reason for the discharge .... "76
Unlike Wickine, the Wilson court had no problem linking the denial of
payment to the discharge decision, at least for the purpose of deciding whether
the pleadings stated a triable claim.
Having satisfied the condition of proximate cause, the court's
determination of whether Western Medical's payment denial was a substantial
factor in Wilson's death then depended on the second condition of cause,
causation in fact. Would Wilson not have committed suicide if he had been
hospitalized as his doctor had wanted? His doctor had testified that "it was
reasonably probable to assume that there was a 'reasonably [sic] medical
probability' that [Wilson] would have been alive if his hospital stay had not
been prematurely terminated." 77 This was sufficient for the court to conclude
that there was "a triable issue of material fact as to whether Western Medical's
conduct was a substantial factor in causing [Wilson's] death."7 8
From this discussion, it is obvious that by applying the substantial factor
test to utilization review payment determinations, the court in Wilson greatly
72 Id. at 667, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
73 Id. at 671, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965), cited in Wilson, 222 Cal. App.
3d at 671-72, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (emphasis added).
75 Wilson, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 669-70, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
78 Id. at 672, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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expanded the potential liability of reviewers over that indicated in Wickline.
Although the court in Wilson was careful to distinguish Widdine, the difference
in result between the two cases seems due as much to a change in outlook by
the court as to a narrow legal distinction. The court in Wickline took a dim
view of utilization review liability, preferring to hold treating physicians
responsible for the care of their patients. In Wilson, however, the court seemed
to view utilization review much more favorably (at least for the purpose of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment). Which of these two views of
utilization review liability is wiser is, of course, ultimately a question of policy,
not law.7 9
IV. DIRECT v. INDIRECT LIABILITY
In general, utilization review activities can be performed either by the
third-party payor itself or by an independent review organization that has
contracted with the third-party payor to perform review activities. If the third-
party payor performs review and makes payment decisions itself (as Medi-Cal
did in Wickline), then it will of course be directly liable to the patient if its
denial of payment is found to be negligent.
The situation is somewhat different, however, when the payor has
contracted with a separate entity (as California Blue Cross had done with
Western Medical Review in Wilson). In that case, the independent review
organization will be directly liable to the patient if the payment denial was
made negligently. The payor, on the other hand, will try to argue that the
reviewer is an independent contractor, and, therefore, the payor should not be
held liable for the reviewer's negligence. 80
However, the payor may still be indirectly liable to the patient, under
several theories. Under one theory, the payor could be held liable if it was
negligent in selecting the independent contractor. According to section 411 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused by
his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful
contractor (a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is
skillfully and carefully done .... 81
79 See infra, notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
80 Section 409 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states that except as
provided for in other sections of the Restatement, "the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the
contractor or his servants."REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).8 1Id. at § 411.
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As utilization review clearly involves a risk of harm to patients if it is not done
skillfully and carefully, the payor may be liable if it selects incompetent or
unqualified entities to perform utilization review for it.82
The payor may also be liable under the principle of ostensible agency or
apparent authority if the payor's conduct makes it reasonably apparent to the
patient that the reviewer is acting as the agent of the payor.83 It has been
suggested that payors may avoid this liability by clearly stating in their policies
that the reviewer is separate and independent.84 However, courts may be likely
to hold payors liable anyway, as the most important fact the patient "knows" is
that the reviewer has informed him that, based on its recommendation, the
payor will not pay for treatment.
V. POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO LIABIITY
Even though the Wilson case makes it appear that the liability exposure for
utilization reviewers is great, two potential barriers to utilization review
liability may narrow liability considerably in actual practice. One is the
doctrine of governmental immunity, which may come into play when the
reviewer or payor is a governmental entity.8 5 The other is the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts state law
tort claims against employer self-funded health benefits plans.86
A. Governmental Immunity
Governmental immunity becomes an issue when the payor who has
reviewed and denied the claim in question is a governmental entity. The major
government payors in the United States are the federal Medicare program and
the state Medicaid programs.
Utilization review under the federal Medicare program is conducted by
Peer Review Organizations (PROs). With a few exceptions, the PROs' review
is mainly retrospective, and is concerned with monitoring the quality of care as
82 It can be said that the risk of harm resulting from incompetently performed
utilization review is clearly "foreseeable,"and where there is "a foreseeable risk of harm to
others unless precautions are taken, it is [the employer's] duty to exercise reasonable care to
select a competent, experienced, and careful contractor... ." PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 7, at 510.
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27 (1958).
84 Helvestine, supra note 9, at 190.
85 See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
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well as the necessity and appropriateness of care.87 Because PRO review is
mainly retrospective, Medicare review liability concerns are not great.
Utilization review under Medicaid, on the other hand, is left up to the
individual states, and is generally "conducted under the auspices of a state
agency with authority to approve or deny claims. . ."88 Since states have some
discretion in setting up their Medicaid programs, those who choose to utilize
prospective review, as California has under its Medi-Cal program, may open
themselves up to liability.
Section 895B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that:
(1) A State and its governmental agencies are not subject to suit without the
consent of the State.
(3) Even when a State is subject to tort liability, it and its governmental
agencies are immune to the liability for acts and ommissions constituting
(b) the exercise of an administrative function involving the determination of
fundamental governmental policy. 89
The comment to this section of the Restatement notes that "in practically
ever [sic] State consent to suit has been given, to a greater or lesser degree." 90
Whether, and to what extent, tort liability for this type of suit has been allowed
will vary by state.
However, even if consent to tort liability has been given, the state
Medicaid entity may still be immune if its payment determination is considered
"the exercise of an administrative function." Although the Restatement's
requirement that the act involve "fimdamental governmental policy" would
seem difficult to meet as to payment decisions involving individual patients,
sometimes the issue is phrased in terms of whether the act involved is
discretionary or merely ministerial in nature.91 The California Government
Code, for example, provides that when broad discretionary powers are
87 See Politser, The PRO Utilization and Quality Review Process: An Overiew-Part I,
AM. COLLEGE OF SURGEONS BULL., May 1989, at 17; Blum, An Analysis of Legal
Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REv. 191,
194-97 (1989).
88 Blum, supra note 87, at 197.
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1965).
90 Id. § 895B comment a.
91 Although the issue is sometimes phrased in this way, the discretionary ministerial
distinction may not be particularly useful. It has been pointed out that the discretionary-
ministerial distinction is "nearly impossible to apply in practice in a consistent manner," for
"[e]ven acts that are ministerial usually require decisionmaking on some minor points." L.
FRUMER, R. BENorr, & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY § 2.03 (1988).
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conferred upon a public employee, both the employee and the public entity that
employs him are immune from liability.92
It could be argued that a state Medicaid physician reviewer exercises
discretion in reviewing patient claims, and, therefore, that state Medicaid
programs should be immune from liability. 93 Of course, equally strong
arguments can be made that the acts of state Medicaid physician reviewers are
merely ministerial, carrying out the policies prescribed by statute. Therefore,
the issue of whether state Medicaid agencies are immune from liability is far
from clear.
B. ERISA Pre-Emption of State Tort Law Claims
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in order to "protect... the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries .... -94 ERISA applies to any employee
benefit plan that is "established or miained... by any employer engaged in
commerce or... by any employee organization or organizations representing
employees engaged in commerce or... by both." 95 ERISA applies to both
employee pension benefit plans and employee welfare benefit plans, 96 and
includes in its definition of employee welfare benefit plans any employee
benefit plan that provides "for its participants or their
beneficiaries.., medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits ....- 97
Because one of the ways in which Congress intended to protect participants
in employee benefit plans was by "eliminating the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent state and local regulation,"98 ERISA contains a very broad pre-
emption clause, which states: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of [ERISA] shall supercede any and all State laws
insofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan ... .,99 A subsequent
section of ERISA qualifies the pre-emption clause by exempting from pre-
92 CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 820.2, 815.2(b) (West 1980), cited in Note, Wickline v.
State: The Emerging Liability of Third Party Health Care Payors, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1023, 1028 (1987).
93 In fact, Medi-Cal raised the defense of discretionary immunity in Wickline, arguing
that it was immune under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2, but the court of appeals did not
discuss the issue. Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1643, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 817
(1986).
94 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
95 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
96 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982).
97 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
98 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent), cited in Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983).
99 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added) (the "pre-emption" clause).
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emption state laws that regulate insurance, banking, and securities. 1°°
However, another section of ERISA goes on to state that employee benefit
plans are deemed not to be insurance companies for the purposes of
interpreting state laws regulating insurance.10 1 Therefore, ERISA-qualified
employee health benefit plans are covered by ERISA's pre-emption clause, and
are exempt under ERISA from state laws that "relate to" employer benefit
plans.
Is a negligence claim against an employee health benefit plan a state law
relating to an employee benefit plan such that it is, therefore, pre-empted by
ERISA? In general, the answer is probably yes. ERISA's pre-emption clause
originally was to apply only to those state laws that "[related to] the specific
subjects covered by ERISA"; however, that provision was rejected prior to
ERISA's enactment in favor of the "relate to" language. 102 This would indicate
that Congress intended ERISA's pre-emption clause to be read very broadly. 10 3
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the ERISA pre-
emption clause broadly. Interpreting ERISA's pre-emption clause in Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Court held that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." 1°4 In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,10 5 the Court
held that Dedeaux's common law claims of tortious breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement against Pilot Life, the
insurance company from whom Dedeaux's employer had purchased a group
insurance policy10 6 to establish an employee disability benefit plan, were pre-
empted by ERISA because they "related to" an employee benefit plan. 107 The
Court also held "that in order to regulate insurance [and, therefore, be saved
from the application of ERISA's pre-emption clause], a law must not just have
an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward
that industry." 0 8
Common law claims of negligence against an employee health benefit plan
for negligent denial of payment clearly "have a connection" with the plan; they
also are not "specifically directed" toward the insurance industry. Following
100 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982) (the "saving"clause).
101 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B) (1982) (the "deemer"clause).
102 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
105 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
106 Employee benefit plans may provide coverage for participants and their
beneficiaries by either purchasing insurance or self-insuring. See Note, ERISA- Pre-
enpion-Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux: Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Pre-
enptive Effect, 36 KAN. L. REV. 611, 615 n.42 (1988).
107 Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47.
108 Id. at50.
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the reasoning of Shaw and Pilot Life, then, it is logical to assume that state
common law negligence claims against employee benefit plans are pre-empted
by ERISA, and in fact most courts "have accorded great deference to the
ERISA pre-emption by disallowing state-law claims in tort... that concern
employer sponsored health benefit plans." 10 9
Because governmental immunity may insulate governmental payors from
liability (depending on the extent to which the governmental entity has waived
its immunity), and because participants in employee sponsored health benefit
plans and their beneficiaries are precluded from bringing negligence actions
against their plans under ERISA's pre-emption clause, the scope of negligent
utilization review liability may in reality be much narrower than Wilson
suggests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Utilization review is a promising tool that insurers, both public and
private, are using with greater frequency to help them combat their spiraling
health care costs. However, they should be aware that, when applied
prospectively, utilization review could expose them to potential negligence
liability. This area of the law, like utilization review itself, is young and still
developing, however, and the scope and extent of liability are still unclear.
Indeed, as this Note has discussed, the two leading cases in this area present
two very different views on third-party payor liability for negligent utilization
review. Wickline v. State of California'1 0 took a rather narrow view of third-
party payor liability, holding that, in most cases, the patient's own physician
has the "ultimate responsibility" for the patient's care. 11 Wilson v. Blue Cross
of Southern California,'12 on the other hand, viewed third-party payor liability
more broadly, holding that payors should be held liable when their negligent
review is a "substantial factor" in the patient's harm.113
Which of these two views is more sound? As a practical matter, Wilson
seems to be a better decision. There are at least two good reasons why third-
party payors should be held liable for negligent review decisions. One is that it
would not be fair to allow third-party payors to intrude into the doctor-patient
relationship and perhaps interfere with medical decisionmaking, and at the
same time allow payors to escape liability for their negligence on the grounds
that the doctor, not the payor, had the "ultimate responsibility" for the patient.
Having invited themselves to the dance, third-party payors should be made to
109 Blum, supra note 87, at 202.
110 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986).
111 See supra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
112 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990).
113 See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
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face the music when things go wrong. The other reason third-party payors
should be held liable for their negligence is that it makes little sense for payors
to say that their determinations result only in a denial of payment, not a denial
of treatment, and therefore, their determinations are not a factor in the patient's
harm if the patient subsequently decides to forego treatment. Realistically,
many patients have no choice but to forego treatment if payment is denied, as
they cannot pay for the treatment out of their own pockets; for them, denial of
payment is the deciding factor in the decision to forego treatment.114
As more courts begin to consider the matter, they may struggle because of
the fundamental tension between the goals of utilization review (to contain costs
and thereby reduce the burden on society of health care spending) and the goals
of the tort system (to compensate individuals for the harms they have
suffered).115 Courts may differ in the extent to which they recognize utilization
review liability depending on which goals they consider most important.
Courts primarily interested in the broad societal goal of cost containment
will probably protect review organizations by recognizing either no liability or
only narrow liability (as in Wickline), while courts concerned with protecting
individual plaintiffs will be more likely to recognize broad liability (as in
Wilson). Viewed in this manner, the determination of utilization review liability
seems to be more a question of policy than of law. Perhaps the issue of
utilization review liability should ultimately be left up to the state legislatures,
rather than the state courts, to decide. 116
At any rate, the issue is certain to arise with greater frequency as utilization
review becomes more common, and more and more patients harmed by a
114 The facts in Wilson vividly illustrate how little choice people sometimes have when
payment is denied. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
115 There has been some debate in the literature over whether or not physicians who
operate under cost containment constraints (such as HMO staff physicians) should be held to
a modified standard of care that takes cost constraints into account. See, e.g., Hall, The
Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 347 (1989); Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1719 (1987).
It has been said that "[t]ort liability is an unwieldy tool of social policy in this
context [cost containment]. Although it may advance the policy of compensating injuries, it
undermines the objective of containing health care expenditures .... " Note, Safe Harbor
for Health Core Cost Containment, 43 STAN. L. REV. 399, 421 (1991).
116 Although this Note has primarily discussed how courts might apply negligence
liability to review organizations, remember that legislatures can also step into this area. For
example, Louisiana has enacted a statute that provides that utilization reviewers will be
liable only for damages (limited to physical injury) resulting from unreasonable delay (as
defined in the statute), denial or reduction of medically necessary services. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:657 (West Supp. 1991).
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payment denial decision feel, as Mrs. Wickline did, that they are "victims of
the system."1 17
Peter H. Mihaly
117 Carlova, supra note 30, at 83.
